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With no readily determined fair market value from market determinations for ownership interests in most farm and 
ranch entities, it has been necessary to establish 
values for stock and other equity interests for fed-
eral estate tax, federal gift tax and federal income 
tax purposes as well as for purposes of fairness in 
making transfers. Until 1990, it was an accepted 
practice to utilize stock transfer restriction provi-
sions to fix values for transfers during life and at 
death. That practice was supplemented by the 
enactment of legislation in 1990. The 1990 pro-
vision recognizes instances where values can be 
fixed at death and a recent case has applied those 
exceptions as well as the rules from the pre-1990 
case law.
The rules in effect before 1990
Under the case-law prevailing before 1990, a stock 
transfer restriction could fix the value of stock or 
other equity securities at death if certain condi-
tions were met – 
(1) the price was fixed or determinable by 
formula; 
(2) the estate was under an obligation to sell 
under a buy-sell agreement or upon exercise 
of an option; 
(3) the obligation to sell was binding during 
life; and 
(4) the arrangement was entered into for 
bona fide business reasons and not as a sub-
stitute for a testamentary disposition.
The 1990 provisions
The 1990 legislation supplemented, but did not 
replace, those guidelines with a general rule that 
such agreements, options or restrictions are not 
effective to set values at less than fair market value 
except for specified exceptions. The 1990 enact-
ment, while acknowledging that agreements, 
options or restrictions could not fix values at less 
than fair market value, articulated three exceptions 
to the general rule. Under the exceptions, agree-
ments, options or restrictions were not subject to 
the general rule if all of three requirements were 
met – 
(1) the agreement, option or restriction was a 
bona fide business arrangement; 
(2) the agreement, option or restriction was 
not a device to transfer the property to mem-
bers of the decedent’s family for less than 
full and adequate consideration in money or 
money’s worth; and 
(3) the terms of the agreement, option or re-
striction were comparable to similar arrange-
ments entered into by persons in an arms’ 
length transaction.
Because the 1990 provisions were meant to 
supplement but not replace prior case law, the 
pre-1990 rules requiring that an agreement, to be 
effective, must be binding during life and at death 
and must contain a fixed and determinable price 
continue to apply.
Tax Court case decided in 2006
In a Tax Court case decided in 2006, an agree-
ment restricting the sale of the decedent’s stock in 
a bank fixed the fair market value in determining 
value for federal estate tax purposes. In 1994, the 
decedent’s conservator and a bank negotiated an 
agreement for the sale of the decedent’s stock in 
the bank, after death, for $118 per share. Litiga-
tion among the prospective heirs ensued and so 
the conservator in 1995 negotiated an agreement 
providing for the decedent and her heirs, except 
for one son, to receive $118 per share of the bank 
stock and for the purchase by the son of the stock 
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remaining in the decedent’s estate for $118 per 
share. In 1997, an agreement with the bank speci-
fied that the bank would pay $217.50 plus four 
percent per year for each share to the son for the 
decedent’s stock purchased by the son.
I.R.S. argued that the 1995 agreement setting the 
value for the stock should be disregarded and the 
value should be used coming from the purchase 
of the stock within a month after the decedent’s 
death.
The Tax Court held that the restrictive agreement 
controlled the value for federal estate tax purposes 
because the requirements for the pre-1990 case 
law and the statutory exceptions were satisfied –
(1) the agreement reached among the pro-
spective heirs fixed the value of all of the 
decedent’s bank stock; 
(2) the agreement between the heirs and the 
conservator was enforceable with a court 
order approving the settlement and granting 
authority to the conservator to carry out the 
terms and conditions of the agreement; 
(3) the agreement furthered a business pur-
pose by minimizing the risk to the decedent 
of holding a minority interest in a closely-
held bank; 
(4) the agreement was found not to be a tes-
tamentary device inasmuch as the decedent 
received “significant” consideration under the 
agreement; The court addressed the differ-
ence between the $118 per share value and 
the $217.50 per share value and found that 
the $118 per share value “. . . was fair at the 
time and in the particular circumstances;” 
and 
(5) the agreement was similar to comparable 
arms’ length agreements.
The Tax Court reasoned that the statutory excep-
tions of I.R.C. § 2703(b) were satisfied so the 
general rule of I.R.C. § 2703(a) did not provide a 
basis for disregarding the earlier, pre-death, agree-
ment which met all of the relevant case-law re-
quirements.
In each case the framing discourse has served to 
limit the nature of the agricultural policies that 
could be considered as “realistic.” In 1985 the 
concern that high US loan rates were pricing US 
producers out of international markets led to a 
reduction in loan rates and the introduction of in-
struments like Loan Deficiency Payments for some 
crops. In 1996 the focus was on getting farmers 
to produce for the market instead of “farming the 
program.” The result was a program that intro-
The development of the 1985 Farm Bill was dominated by the search for policies that would allow the US to regain the share of 
export markets it held in the late 1970s. The talk 
surrounding the formation of the 1996 Farm Bill 
was “getting the government out of agriculture.” 
With the 2007 Farm Bill looming on the horizon, 
the framing discourse involves designing policies 
that are compliant with World Trade Organization 
requirements.
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duced fixed decoupled payments and the wide-
spread use of LDPs to allow the US price to fall to 
the world price, while protecting farm income.
In the present setting, trade negotiations cluster 
around two scenarios: full liberalization and the 
most likely outcome. Full trade liberalization calls 
for the elimination of all subsidies and all tariffs, 
allowing the marketplace to determine all produc-
tion decisions. The likely scenario includes poli-
cies that would substitute “non trade distorting” 
programs, like risk management, for more direct 
subsidies.
If one were to look for a model of what a more 
complete liberalization would look like, Brazil 
would certainly come to mind. The rapid expan-
sion of soybean producing areas has taken place 
without commodity-program-like government 
subsidies. As a part of its push for full liberaliza-
tion, Brazil won a case against the US cotton pro-
gram arguing that portions of that program were 
trade distorting.
When we were in Brazil three months ago, the 
roads were filled with trucks delivering their cargo 
of soybeans to local crushers and export points. 
Today nearly all of the movement of soybeans in 
the center west of Brazil has come to a halt as the 
result of protests by farmers. With the increas-
ing cost of petroleum products and the loss of 
purchasing power as the result of a strengthening 
of the Brazilian Real, most farmers are caught in 
a squeeze as local soybean prices drop below the 
cost of production.
Three weeks into the protests, the Brazilian gov-
ernment offered a commodity-specific financial 
package that amounted to about a half a billion 
dollars. Farmers rejected the package as inade-
quate and the government has promised to recon-
sider the offer. The farmers are hoping for substan-
tial aid to help them deal with two to three years of 
production debts, not to mention capital costs.
Canada, on the other hand, is a model of a country 
that has replaced traditional farm programs with a 
revenue-insurance-type risk management strategy. 
Many analysts in the US see the Canadian farm 
insurance program as a model for the US farm 
program.
Recent developments in Canada would suggest 
that the insurance program does not work out as 
well as its proponents expected and today Cana-
dian farmers find themselves in financial trouble. 
As a result the Canadian government has made 
available C$950 million to farmers in trouble and 
has proposed re-separating disaster assistance from 
income stabilization. 
This presents an interesting juxtaposition of cir-
cumstances where farmers in countries, such as 
Brazil and Canada, operating under apparently 
WTO compliant policies are calling for more gov-
ernment support while the US is looking for ways 
to reduce its support of agriculture. Hmmmm. . . 
